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DISARMAMENT IN THE CONGO: INVESTING IN CONFLICT
PREVENTION
I. INTRODUCTION
There are many challenges facing the Lusaka cease-fire signatories and the wider
international community in implementing the Congolese peace agreement, but
perhaps none so complex as the effort to disarm the non-Congolese armed groups
destabilising the region from Congolese bases. Besides wreaking havoc themselves,
these armed groups provide a rationale for neighbouring governments to conduct
the counterinsurgency operations and continue the occupation of Congolese territory
that have terrible humanitarian and human rights impacts. These armed groups –
the largest of which are the forces associated with the former Rwandan Army (ex-
FAR) and Interahamwe militias that carried out the 1994 Rwandan genocide -- are
not the root cause of all of the Congo’s problems, but their continued presence in the
Congo is the primary cause of the war and much of the worst violence, whether of
their own doing or of the neighbouring governments seeking to counter them.
Since the genocide in Rwanda in 1994, the response of the international community
to the problem of the armed groups has been disastrously negligent. It has tolerated
the rearmament of the ex FAR and Interahamwe in DRC refugee camps and the
consequent military interventions of the Rwandan, Ugandan and Burundian
governments. In 1996 and 1998, the crisis has followed the same itinerary: from
Rwanda to eastern Congo to Kinshasa. Twice, it has led to massive violence and a
tragic humanitarian situation. Twice, it has triggered the formation of regional
coalitions, with this present conflict creating new reasons for hostility and rivalry
between states, further destabilising all central African countries.
Lasting peace in Central Africa is largely dependent on a successful strategy of
Disarmament, Demobilisation, Reintegration or Resettlement (DDRR) of these armed
groups. The ultimate success of this strategy, furthermore, is intimately linked to the
development of political institutions and the formation of a national army and police
in the Congo that will inhibit the re-emergence of armed groups, both foreign and
domestic. Hence, the success of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue, particularly in
integrating and rationalising the armed forces, will be critical. It is also linked to
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prospects of political change and dialogue in the neighbouring countries exporting
their civil wars to the Congo.
A UN Security Council delegation has just returned from a tour in the countries
involved in the DRC war. Based on their assessment, the Secretary General is
preparing a report making recommendations on whether the UN observer mission in
DRC (MONUC) should move from phase II (disengagement of forces) to phase III
(withdrawal and disarmament). The mission reiterated the message from Security
Council Resolution 1341 of 22 February 2001, that it will not undertake a Chapter VII
peace enforcement operation to disarm these armed groups, hoping instead for
bilateral deals between the Congolese and the Rwandan government. The Security
Council is unlikely to expand the mandate of MONUC, which allows for 5,500
personnel. Nevertheless, within the existing mandate, there is scope to adjust
priorities to enable MONUC to contribute effectively to the DDRR effort. First, a civil-
military planning section to co-ordinate DDRR activities would help provide structure
and focus for the effort. Second, authority to assist voluntary DDRR initiatives where
needed would give MONUC the flexibility it needs to encourage the Lusaka Cease-
Fire signatories to move forward. This is particularly pertinent to the likely request
for MONUC support for security in any assembly areas for demobilised combatants.
Despite welcome signs of renewed international interest in the DRC peace process,
any signal from the Security Council that it is not prepared to play an important
supportive role in the DDRR process while simultaneously demanding that the parties
withdraw would be naïve and risky. Containment of the regional dimension of the
war through insistence on disengagement of foreign troops is not enough to stabilise
the DRC. If no progress is made on this issue, the war will likely resume either
through an explosion in the Kivus or reversal of the momentum on disengagement.
The Lusaka agreement was a cease-fire agreement, not a peace agreement. All of
the necessary elements are present in the cease-fire agreement, but much work
remains to be done to flesh out the specific requirements for longer-term regional
security, political development, and economic co-operation.
II. SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM
Estimates vary and no authoritative, impartial numbers exist, but it is broadly
understood that as many as 15,000 Rwandan Hutu armed forces remain in the
Congo. These are divided roughly equally between those that are integrated in or
fighting alongside the Congolese Armed Forces (FAC), and those operating as militia
in the Kivus in eastern Congo (in Masisi, Shabunda, Kahuzi-biega, and Virunga
areas). What is unknown is the percentage of these forces that organised or
participated in Rwanda’s 1994 genocide, and those that have been recruited since.
According to official Rwandan sources, up to 80 percent could be repatriated without
fear of punishment for participation in the genocide. Either way, the doctrine remains
focused on the overthrow of the government in Kigali, and some elements preach
continuation of the genocide. There are increasing attempts by subgroups among
the Hutu armed groups and the Hutu Diaspora leadership, though, to legitimise itself
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by focusing on creating a unified inclusive organisation with clear political objectives
that obviously would distance itself from a genocidal ideology.
The Burundian Forces for the Defence of Democracy (FDD) forms the second largest
of the armed groups, estimated at roughly 10,000 militia. They are also integrated in
the FAC and are moving between the DRC, Burundi and Tanzania. They have shown
consistent resistance in joining the Burundi peace process. Both the Rwandan and
the Burundians Hutus fight alongside each other and with various Congolese
resistance groups, collectively known as Mai Mai, composed of many different groups
and a few thousands fighters. The Mai Mai are not labelled "negative forces" by the
Lusaka agreement, but they have been trading arms with the Hutu groups and
fighting the same enemy. Their disarmament is envisioned by the Lusaka agreement
at a later stage, after a new national army is created. Other groups are much
smaller, and they include the Ugandan Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) and the Union
for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA).
Despite the multitude of groups and warlords and despite different national agendas,
the ex-FAR/Interahamwe, the FDD and the Mai Mai groups are operating increasingly
as an integrated army, largely as a result of Congolese and Zimbabwean support and
training. They have shown greater sophistication and greater co-ordination in the last
few months, and the ethnic Hutu-Tutsi agenda seems increasingly to influence the
ideology of the Mai Mai, who see themselves as resisting Tutsi occupation in the
DRC.
III. NEW OPPORTUNITY FOR PROGRESS
Since the death of Laurent Kabila, there has been halting progress made by the
signatories and United Nations in implementing the Lusaka Agreement. The cease-
fire has been respected so far, and disengagement of troops has started. The
Security Council mission was particularly successful in ensuring continuing progress
on disengagement of forces. Presidents Joseph Kabila and Paul Kagame have met on
the DDRR issue, and contacts have continued between the two governments. The
Rwandan government has focused and prioritised its demands around a cessation of
state support to the armed groups, the arrest of the ringleaders of the genocide, and
international support for greatly expanded voluntary demobilisation and reintegration
efforts. The DRC government in return has recognised the security needs of Rwanda.
Kinshasa offered to transfer a substantial number of ex-FAR/Interahamwe to the
Kamina army base, and identify them under the monitoring of a neutral guard force.
Based on this identification process, the combatants could be repatriated to Rwanda,
resettled, or – if indicted for war crimes -- transferred to the International Criminal
Tribunal in Arusha. At the Joint Military Commission meeting in May, the Congolese
government acknowledged the presence of 5000 Rwandan Hutus and 3000 FDD on
the territory of the DRC, without however recognising their integration into the
Congolese army.
Resolution 1341 of 22 February 2001 was also a political response to this new
window of opportunity. It urged "parties to the conflict in close liaison with MONUC,
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to prepare by May 15, 2001 for immediate implementation of prioritised plans for the
disarmament, demobilisation, reintegration, repatriation and resettlement of all
armed groups… and demands that all parties cease all forms of assistance and co-
operation with these groups and use their influence to urge such groups to cease
their activities."
Prior and parallel to these bilateral contacts, intensive DDRR consultations among the
signatories, buttressed by American and British joint diplomacy, have produced a
draft plan for DDRR that shifts the focus away from earlier signatory demands for a
Chapter VII UN force to track and forcibly disarm the armed groups. The new plan
combines a demand for an end to state support for the armed groups with a credible
voluntary DDRR initiative.
The development of a more realistic plan was due in the first instance to an
increasingly important Joint Military Commission (JMC), a body created by the Lusaka
Agreement to handle implementation issues and chaired ably by Kenyan General
Njuki Mwanyiki. The UN Secretary General Special Representative Kamel Morjane has
also been a key to forward movement on this issue. The JMC plan – endorsed by the
Political Committee of signatory ministers – calls for the following:
 a timeframe and monitoring mechanism for the cessation of all support to the
armed groups;
 a voluntary DDRR initiative;
 monitoring teams to safeguard against human rights abuses throughout the
process;
 provision of UN forces as security for the assembly points; and
 UN co-ordination of the overall effort.
IV. MAJOR CHALLENGES TO DDRR
A. State Support for the Armed Groups
In the absence of an effective Congolese army, the late President Laurent Kabila and
his allies undertook a strategy of arming, resupplying, training, and organising the
ex-FAR/Interahamwe, FDD, and ADF forces. These armed groups became the front
line infantry for the alliance, pawns in their effort both to defend positions held as
well as to take the unconventional aspect of the war eastward, directly to the
borders of the invading countries.
Given that these armed groups are key fighting forces on behalf of the Congolese
government, it will be very difficult for Kinshasa to completely cut these forces off
and let them go via a DDRR strategy. There will be great pressure to sustain some
support and maintain some links to these groups as an insurance policy if the war
were to resume. The Congolese army is so weak that Joseph Kabila remains
dependent on these armed groups and his regional allies to hold the front-line and
guarantee a minimum stability in Kinshasa. If Zimbabwe reduces its defence lines as
part of the disengagement agreement or because of its own internal political
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situation, Kabila's government will become more -- not less -- dependent on the
armed groups. Furthermore, continued support to these armed groups provides
Kinshasa with a trump card should it want to intensify the war in the Kivus or directly
in its eastern neighbours, while gaining a bargaining chip in negotiations about
power-sharing in Kinshasa.
B. Lack of Capacity to Implement Agreements
Further complicating the picture is the lack of capacity of the Congolese government
to deliver on any commitments it will make to help collect and/or disarm the armed
groups and arrest their leaders. Even if it were able to concentrate these forces in
certain locations, this would itself constitute a security threat to the Congolese army.
For now, a sign of good faith would be to continue providing information on the
whereabouts and the structure of these groups, and to engage seriously with the
Rwandan government in bilateral talks on this issue.
C. Absence of a Broader Peace Framework
Negotiation on DDRR should therefore be part of a wider agenda concerning military,
political and economic issues among the belligerents. The first item on the agenda of
these negotiations should be a pact of non-aggression between the two coalitions.
The second would be to find regional guarantees that the Kinshasa government's
future stability won't be jeopardised by these same groups resisting disarmament.
D. Violence in the East: Towards a Resumption of War?
Forward movement on implementing the Lusaka agreement and DDRR process
appears to have caused a movement of Hutu insurgents towards the East.
Precipitous movements by large groups of ex-FAR/Interahamwe or FDD to escape
DDRR will have grave repercussions for regional stability. FDD forces are already
infiltrating Burundi and Tanzania, perhaps in preparation for a major attack in
Burundi. If they are joined in their offensive by large numbers of ex-
FAR/Interahamwe, this could tilt the military balance against the Bujumbura
government, provoking Rwandan government intervention and further widening that
war. Further, large numbers of the formed forces of ex-FAR/Interahamwe are
infiltrating the Kivus to join their compatriots, which is again likely to provoke a
major Rwandan reaction. Violence has already escalated in the Kivus and at the
Rwandan border. RPA redeployment of troops from Pweto (a few thousand men) has
led to new operations against the Hutu armed groups and the Mai Mai in Masisi,
Shabunda, and Bunyakiri areas and on the Uvira-Fizi axis. There is now a serious
possibility of major bloodshed in the Kivus. It can be expected that military pressure
exerted on the armed groups will cut off their supply line and push them to loot the
local population. Also, it is likely that the increasing presence of RPA troops will
exacerbate Congolese hostility and resistance to occupation.
RCD-Goma has denounced the Congolese government’s continuous support for the
Hutu insurgent movements in the DRC and warned that the cease-fire would not
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hold for much longer if violence continued. If the Congolese double-cross Rwanda
(or even don’t make a minimal effort) on DDRR, the war will likely re-ignite.
E. The Armed Groups Hope for Military Victory
Finally, the armed groups themselves have reasons not to partake in DDRR efforts.
The combination of their forces provides these groups with increased hopes of
overthrowing the Rwandan and Burundian regimes. To deal with the armed groups,
it is imperative to analyse their agendas and to deal with them each through bottom
up and top down approaches.
The FDD remains outside the Arusha process. The FDD have shown reluctance to
participate in the Burundi peace process, and will do so as long as they have a hope
to win militarily, fuelled by other countries' government support. The ADF is not
negotiating with the Ugandan government, and few have taken advantage of an
amnesty there. Ex-FAR/Interahamwe forces are vilified (correctly in some cases) as
genocidaires, fear prosecution or summary execution, are tightly controlled by
leaders who did help organise the genocide, and have received a lifetime of
indoctrination against the RPF as the group that wants to destroy the Hutu. The Mai
Mai are a mix of organised resistance groups and less organised warlords who grew
out of poverty and chaos. To achieve a successful DDRR process of the Hutu armed
groups, the Mai Mai need to be convinced to separate from them. It is impossible to
ask them to do so without a major reconciliation and rehabilitation effort at the local
level in the Kivus.
CONCLUSION
The window of opportunity for peace created by the elder Kabila's death is closing. The
DDRR plan emerging from the Lusaka signatories represents a significant compromise and a
basis for action. It requires robust support from the international community. Since the
1994 genocide, the international community has done nothing to address the myriad
problems posed by its perpetrators, the ex-FAR/Interahamwe. The international community
must finally assume a share of the burden on this critical issue and in furthering regional
agreement on security issues. If not, what looms is the continuation of occupation and
violence, a series of battles for influence and spoils, and, most ominously, the reignition of
regional war.
RECOMMENDATIONS
To the Congolese Government:
1. Provide all information on the whereabouts of these armed groups and contribute
actively to the disarmament and demobilisation effort.
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2. Clearly identify the Congolese government's security needs in the short and long
term.
3. Immediately cease all support to those forces and allow monitoring to that effect.
4. Contribute in the regional and international effort to apprehend those indicted by
the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and others accused of crimes
against humanity.
To the Rwandan, Ugandan and Burundian Governments:
5. Create the necessary conditions domestically conducive to the return of ex-
combatants, including the provision of amnesties where appropriate, strict
adherence to the rule of law, and total transparency in the handling of these ex-
combatants, by allowing full international monitoring of the reintegration process,
including the justice component as served through gacaca1 in Rwanda.
6. Engage in domestic reconciliation efforts and give concrete signs of political
accommodation of some of the armed groups' demands.
7. Provide MONUC and the JMC with all the necessary information on the armed
groups in the Kivus.
8. Comply fully with all of the elements of Lusaka, particularly for their
disengagement and withdrawal.
To the Zimbabwean and Angolan Governments
9. Commit to the provisions of any agreement on DDRR, including the cessation of
all support to the armed groups, the provision of information on their locations,
and participation in efforts to disarm and demobilise them.
To the UN Security Council and Donor Governments
10. Reinforce the effort to cease all support to the armed groups by:
 creating and resourcing a monitoring mechanism,
 encouraging the Rwandan leadership to come up with a specific benchmark of
progress in the DDRR effort that would suffice to meet its concerns so that it
can withdraw completely from the DRC,
 offering training and equipment to regional customs and immigration officials,
 arresting any of the indicted leadership of the armed groups that cross
international borders,
 providing intelligence on the whereabouts of the armed groups, and
 treating the ex-FAR/Interahamwe in the same manner as UNITA by
implementing existing Security Council resolutions aimed at isolating the ex-
FAR/Interahamwe. UN Security Council Resolutions 918 (1994), 997 (1995),
                    
1 A traditional system of administering justice that will be revived as of July 2001
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1011 (1995), and 1341 (2001), as well as the recommendations of the report
of the UN Commission of Inquiry on Rwanda (1997) provide a legal basis for
the resumption of an arms embargo against the ex-FAR/Interahamwe and the
countries supporting them.
On the role of MONUC
11. Provide an appropriate DDRR mandate for MONUC during Phase Three of the
Mission, and create a DDRR co-ordinating mechanism within MONUC to oversee
the process.
12. Provide a mandate for MONUC – if asked -- to provide security in the assembly
areas during demobilisation, with the understanding that ex-combatants will only
be processed in these sites and quickly repatriated or resettled elsewhere.
On funding the DDRR process
13. Supplement the contributions of signatories in generating the necessary
resources for demobilisation, including enhanced logistics, communication,
infrastructure, and re-supply.
14. Undertake a major effort at mobilising resources quickly – through an early
donors meeting -- for designing and implementing credible reintegration and
resettlement programs that will act as an incentive to draw members of armed
groups out of the Congo. Consider the establishment of an International Trust
Fund for the DDRR process in Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda, and Angola.
15. Help publicise the DDRR programs in the region, with a particular effort to
circulate information in the Kivus and refugee camps.
On monitoring the DDRR process
16. Provide human rights monitors to guard against abuses in reintegration.
On supporting resettlement
17. Identify third countries to act as resettlement areas for armed group members
not wishing to be repatriated, and provide resources for resettlement.
On Burundi
18. Put pressure on the governments of DRC and Tanzania to convince FDD leaders
to enter into immediate talks with the Buyoya government.
19. Ensure harmonisation the Lusaka and Arusha processes.
On the Kivus
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20. Recognise the existence of Mai Mai leaders, and encourage the RCD to reach a
cease-fire with the Mai Mai, through traditional leaders, civil society and the
church, and to engage in a broader political dialogue with these actors.
21. Support a major reconciliation and rehabilitation effort in the Kivus.
